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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The title of this Article derives from one of the best-known articles 
in law and economics. In 1972, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas 
Melamed published a paper entitled, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.1 The subtitle was a 
reference to a series of paintings by Monet showing the same 
cathedral in a variety of lighting and weather conditions.2 The title’s 
implication was that the article was offering only one among many 
possible perspectives.3 In a similar way, this Article is meant to 
provide an alternative perspective on a well-known scene. 
 The scene in question involves a recondite area of legal doctrine—
the constitutionality of requiring waiver of a constitutional right as a 
condition of receiving some governmental benefit. Under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the government is sometimes, 
but by no means always, blocked from imposing such conditions on 
                                                                                                                      
 * Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to 
thank John Yoo and the participants at the Symposium on Default Rules in Private and 
Public Law for helpful comments. 
 1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inaleinability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  
 2. See id. at 1090 n.2.  
 3. See id. at 1089, 1090 n.2.  
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grants.4 This doctrine has long been considered an intellectual and 
doctrinal swamp. As one recent author has said, “[t]he Supreme 
Court’s failure to provide coherent guidance on the subject is, alas, 
legendary.”5 This topic is perhaps less inspiring than the panoramic 
view of the classical edifice of private law offered by Calabresi and 
Melamed.6  This Article certainly does not aspire to a similar level of 
impact,7 but it does share with their article the effort to provide a 
new perspective on a familiar set of problems without claiming that 
this perspective is the only valid one. 
 The fact that constitutional rights can be waived is usually 
something of an afterthought. The perspective offered in this Article 
places waiver in the foreground. Despite the Declaration of 
Independence’s proclamation of inalienable rights,8 constitutional 
rights are indeed alienable in the sense that they can be waived in 
return for various benefits.9 For example, in return for government 
funding, family planning clinics may lose their right to engage in 
abortion referrals.10 Similarly, the right to a jury trial can be 
surrendered in return for a lighter sentence as part of a plea 
bargain.11 The fact that constitutional rights can be the subject of 
bargaining suggests that contract theory might be able to provide 
some useful insights. 
 To the extent that they can be traded for benefits, constitutional 
rights can be seen as resembling contractual default rules. A 
contractual default is simply the rule that the law supplies when the 
parties to a contract have not supplied a relevant provision of their 
own.12 Similarly, a constitutional right applies in the absence of a 
contrary contractual understanding between the individual and the 
government. Thinking of constitutional rights in this way may seem 
counter-intuitive, but it can also be illuminating because recent 
scholarship in law and economics has provided a growing 
understanding of the problem of how to design contractual defaults.13 
If nothing else, we are in a position to ask interesting new questions 
about how unconstitutional conditions may relate to transaction costs, 
                                                                                                                      
 4. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001). 
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1.  
 7. Indeed, given the preliminary nature of this Article, perhaps it might even have 
been entitled “Another Glimpse of the Quagmire.” 
 8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 9. See infra Part II.  
 10. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178-80 (1991) (describing the government 
funding program and its restrictions); id. at 203 (finding the program constitutional). 
 11. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 12. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
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information asymmetries, and other familiar economic concepts. 
Contract theory does not necessarily explain all the contours of judicial 
doctrine, but it does provide a deeper understanding of the issues, as 
well as suggesting grounds for critique.  
 Part II of this Article explains the constitutional background. It 
shows that constitutional rights are often exchanged for government 
benefits with the full approval of the courts. There may or may not be 
any inalienable constitutional rights; but if they do exist, they are 
the rare exceptions. Most, if not all, constitutional rights can be 
bartered away in at least some circumstances. This may seem 
paradoxical, but it should not be: having a right often means being 
free to decide on what terms to exercise it or not.  
 Part III then turns to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and 
explains how that doctrine limits the ability to opt out of 
constitutional rights. Using the example of First Amendment law, 
this part demonstrates the difficulties that courts have encountered 
in applying the doctrine. It then examines the conflicting theories 
offered by some major scholars in an effort to explain the doctrine. It 
is safe to say that none of these theories has carried the field.  
 Part IV further shows how the problem of unconstitutional 
conditions can be clarified by considering constitutional rights as a 
variety of contract default. Contract theory provides some insights 
into these restrictions on opt-outs. It would be unrealistic to claim 
that contract theory “solves” the problems of unconstitutional 
conditions, but it does provide another way of analyzing the issues. It 
also helps explain why some parts of the doctrine are such a mess: 
the court is essentially trying to police contract terms in a way that 
has been rejected as unworkable for ordinary contracts. 
 Finally, Part V critiques some aspects of current doctrine that place 
substantive limits on contracts to opt out of constitutional rights. 
These substantive restrictions limit the terms that the government is 
allowed to offer to obtain a waiver. For instance, in exchange for a 
permit to develop land, a landowner can waive the Fifth Amendment 
entitlement to compensation for a property interest, but only if a clear 
nexus exists between the property right and the impact of the 
development.14 Nothing like this nexus rule exists in ordinary contract 
law. We do not, after all, say that a lawnmower can be bartered only to 
obtain other landscaping equipment or seeds; it can be bartered for a 
basket of fruit, a baseball ticket, or anything else the parties agree on. 
From the point of view of contract theory, the nexus rule is a very 
peculiar restriction on trade. 
                                                                                                                      
 14. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
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 Such restrictions do not relate in any clear way to identifiable 
flaws in the bargaining process. The effect of these restrictions is to 
block bargains even when the parties would enter into them 
completely voluntarily.15 These restrictions may arguably serve social 
interests unconnected with the preferences of the parties, for 
example by preventing the “commodification” of constitutional rights 
(meaning the loss of their social meaning as essential to personhood 
rather than mere marketable assets). The nexus requirement, 
however, is an unsatisfactory way of achieving these interests. For 
example, if the concern is commodification, it makes no sense to 
apply the nexus rule to property interests in land. After all, those 
interests are marketable for cash already, so we do not need to worry 
that unrestricted bargaining with the government will somehow 
destroy their pristine character. 
 The purpose of this Article is by no means to argue for abolishing the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and thereby deregulating the 
“market” for constitutional rights. Defects in the bargaining process are 
a serious concern. Courts may also be justified in limiting exchanges for 
other reasons, such as agency problems involving government officials 
or concern about the social effects of making constitutional rights 
appear to be mere commodities. We might therefore expect the market 
to be restricted in many ways. Nevertheless, current doctrine has done a 
poor job of articulating the reasons for blocking the exchange of 
constitutional rights for government benefits. It has done an even worse 
job of identifying which exchanges are objectionable.16 We might be 
better off if we acknowledged that this market exists and that in fact we 
have legitimized much of this trade. We could then have a much more 
candid and fruitful discussion about which exchanges to block and why. 
 In particular, it is helpful to distinguish between three types of 
reasons for blocking exchanges of constitutional rights for 
government benefits. The first type of reason is the least 
controversial. As with any private contract, we should avoid 
enforcement where asymmetrical information, imperfect rationality, 
or other flaws make it likely that the bargain will not be in the 
interests of both parties. Second, as in the case of private contracts, 
we may block some transactions even though they are in the 
interests of the parties. The grounds for banning the exchange are 
clearest when the agreement would adversely affect the interests of 
third parties in some tangible way. Arguably, we may also want to 
block exchanges that adversely affect the social meaning of 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. For example, as we will see, the Court has come up with particularly stringent 
limits on exchanges between land owners and the government, while making criminal 
procedure rights freely waivable without regard to the increasingly coercive context facing 
criminal defendants. 
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constitutional rights, degrading society’s sense of its connection with 
personhood. Third, we may want to block the exchange for reasons 
that are specific to public law, unconnected with contract theory. In 
particular, we may wish to screen transactions for improper 
government motivations or for infringements on some norm of 
equality—both of which come together when the government’s 
purpose is to single out a politically disfavored group. We should 
attempt to be clear on whether our objection involves more or less 
standard contracting problems or whether it involves one of the less 
tangible grounds. Among its other flaws, current doctrine completely 
obfuscates these distinctions. 
II.   OPTING OUT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 Some of the resistance to connecting constitutional rights to 
contract law is that we are accustomed to thinking of these rights as 
inalienable, if not sacred. But numerous contexts exist in which 
constitutional rights are surrendered with some government benefit 
serving as the consideration. Indeed, as we will see, some 
constitutional rights (especially those relating to criminal procedure) 
are, in practice, used almost entirely as bargaining chips; rarely are 
they retained and actually exercised by the holder of the rights. Only 
the small minority of criminal cases feature an actual trial where the 
defendant objects to the admission of evidence on constitutional 
grounds. Far more frequently, the threat of a constitutional objection 
serves to buy the defendant a better bargain with the prosecutor. 
 Are there any inalienable constitutional rights? The right to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishments set forth in the Eighth 
Amendment seems a plausible candidate, but even this is unclear. At 
least one condemned prisoner was effectively able to waive this right 
by dropping all appeals, even though the state’s sentencing law was 
arguably a violation of the Eighth Amendment.17 He probably could 
have extracted some concession from the state in exchange, such as 
an agreement about the details of the execution or the disposition of 
his body. Quite possibly, inalienable constitutional rights simply do 
not exist in our legal system.18 In any event, as this Article will 
discuss, existing law clearly does make a broad range of 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014-16 (1976) (finding that the prisoner 
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights); id. at 1018 (arguing that the state law 
violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 18. Another way of looking at this is that we generally consider nonwaivable rules to 
be structural provisions rather than rights. For example, subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be waived, while personal jurisdiction can.  We do not speak of individuals having 
the “right” to be sued in federal court only if subject matter jurisdiction exists.  On the 
other hand, we do consider personal jurisdiction to be a due process “right.” See Ins. Corp. 
of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701-04 (1982) (describing 
the difference between personal and subject matter jurisdictions). 
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constitutional rights subject to alienation, even if some exception to 
this rule turns out to exist. 
A.   State Immunities 
 We begin with some unusual constitutional rights—those held by 
state governments rather than by individuals. Governments may 
seem unlikely candidates as rights bearers, at least from the 
perspective of moral theory, but state immunities have been, on 
occasion, as carefully protected as individual rights.19 However, these 
immunities are subject to contractual modification. 
 The Supreme Court has especially championed the Eleventh 
Amendment right of states to be free from federal litigation.20 The 
Court seems to view this immunity in deep, almost reverential tones. 
Recent Eleventh Amendment decisions are replete with references to 
the dignity of the states, a dignity that would be offended if they 
were freely subject to suit by mere human beings.21 Apparently, 
however, their dignity is consistent with being sued by the United 
States government or by other states. 
 Fortunately for the states, and probably for the rest of us, their 
inherent dignity does not stand in the way of selling this 
constitutional birthright for the proverbial “mess of pottage.” The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that a state’s constitutional 
immunity can be waived.22 In particular, Congress can offer 
inducements to the states to obtain such waivers.23 Thus, the 
Eleventh Amendment is really just a contractual default rule that 
the states are free to barter away.24 Were this not true, sovereign 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 675-77 (discussing the long recognized doctrine of sovereign immunity); id. at 
681-83 (analogizing sovereign immunity to individually protected rights). 
 20. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. A particularly good introduction to the Eleventh Amendment and its tangled 
jurisprudence can be found in Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1. For further background, see Vicki C. Jackson, 
The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 
1 (1988); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action 
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975). 
 21. See Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1126-27 
(2000). 
 22. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). 
 23. See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686-87 (discussing the difference between 
inducement and compulsion). 
 24. For further discussion of the implications of the power of states to barter away 
their sovereign immunity, see Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh 
Amendment, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 141 (1996); Neil S. Siegel, Why the Eleventh 
Amendment Always Matters, Even When Transaction Costs Are Zero: A Reply to Professor 
Farber, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 177 (2001).  
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immunity would be less a pedestal for the state than a cage from 
which it could not escape. 
 Another example of a constitutional default rule is provided by New 
York v. United States,25 which recognized another constitutional 
immunity of state governments.26  New York involved a federal statute 
governing disposal of low-level nuclear waste.27 The statute provided 
three kinds of incentives to encourage states to provide disposal sites.28 
First, states that already had disposal sites were authorized to charge 
gradually increasing fees for waste from other states.29 One quarter of 
the fee was used to make payments to states that provided new sites.30 
Second, states that failed to meet certain deadlines could be charged 
higher surcharges and eventually could be denied access to disposal 
facilities altogether.31 Third, the so-called take title provision told 
states that eventually they would literally own the problem 
themselves if they did not cooperate.32 New York filed suit, claiming 
that the statute “commandeered” its state legislature by forcing it to 
pass legislation authorizing a disposal site.33  
 The Court struck down the “take title” provision and reinforced 
the state’s immunity from such commandeering.34 In the Court’s 
view, the “take title” provision offered states a choice between two 
options, neither of which Congress had the power to mandate 
separately.35 It could not order states to pass legislation, nor could it 
require them to subsidize generators of nuclear waste by taking over 
the disposal problem.36 Thus, states cannot be forced to help 
administer federal programs. Of course, they may want to do so 
voluntarily. But this voluntary participation need not be spontaneous 
on the part of the states. The Court also held that Congress could 
offer the states inducements to pass the desired legislation, either by 
attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funds or by threatening 
to preempt regulation of waste disposal entirely in states that failed 
to pass such legislation.37 Such inducements were constitutional 
because they left the ultimate choice of whether to comply with the 
residents of the states in question.38 
                                                                                                                      
 25. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 26. Arguably, the Court “invented” this immunity rather than merely “recognizing” it. 
 27. New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.  
 28. Id. at 152-54. 
 29.  Id. at 152-53. 
 30.  Id. at 152. 
 31. Id. at 153. 
 32.  Id. at 153-54. 
 33. Id. at 160-161.  
 34.  Id. at 175-77. 
 35. Id. 
 36.  Id. at 176. 
 37. Id. at 166-67.  
 38. Id. at 168.  
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 Thus, the default rule is that states do not participate in the 
implementation of federal programs. States may, however, opt out of 
this rule and agree to participate in return for federal benefits. The 
problem with the “take title” provision was that Congress was trying 
to use a bargaining chip that it did not own. It could not directly 
order states to “take title” to waste; hence, its offer to forebear from 
doing so on certain conditions was meaningless. In contract terms, 
we could say that the contract was invalid because the consideration 
was illusory, being merely a promise to forebear from doing 
something that the government had no right to do anyway. 
 State immunity is a nice illustration of the reasons why 
constitutional rights are generally subject to waiver or exchange. It 
would be a burden on states to make their immunities compulsory. A 
state may well want to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to 
get a better interest rate from creditors, and it is not obvious why it 
should be forbidden to do so. Indeed, one could even argue that the 
states have a constitutional right to waive their immunities in return 
for other benefits. The Tenth Amendment says that the states retain 
their preconstitutional powers except to the extent that those powers 
are transferred to the federal government or forbidden to the states.39 
The right to waive sovereign immunity to obtain other benefits was 
held by the states prior to joining the Union.  Power over this right 
was not, in the view of the current Court, transferred to the federal 
government, which is why Congress cannot simply override the 
states’ immunity. It is hard to identify any provision of the 
Constitution that even arguably limits the states’ exercise of this 
right. Hence, like state immunity itself, the states’ freedom to barter 
away its immunity may itself be a constitutional right. 
 The more general point is that rights often serve to protect an 
actor’s autonomy. Part of that autonomy is the power to decide when 
to exercise the right and under what circumstances to forebear from 
exercising the right. As a general matter, making a right inalienable 
limits the freedom of choice of the right holder and, thus, is a prima 
facie invasion of his or her (or in the case of a state government, its) 
autonomy. 
B.   First Amendment 
 Freedom of speech may be the paradigmatic constitutional right. 
Despite their importance, however, speech rights are alienable, at 
least in some contexts. The Supreme Court has staunchly defended 
First Amendment rights in modern years, but it has allowed the 
government to restrict those rights in exchange for providing benefits.  
                                                                                                                      
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
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 The simplest examples of government restrictions on free speech 
involve public employees.40 For instance, government employees may 
lose their right to participate in political campaigns. If there is 
anything at the core of the First Amendment, it is the right to 
support the election of candidates to office.41 Yet the Court has 
repeatedly upheld the government’s power to require the surrender 
of this right in return for government employment.42 
 The Court views speech by government employees as being 
limited in other respects as well. In Pickering v. Board of 
Education,43 a teacher was fired for writing a newspaper letter 
criticizing the school board’s fiscal policies.44 Normally, unless the 
letter was defamatory, it would have been absolutely protected by 
the First Amendment. Not so when the author is a public employee.45 
The Court saw its task as finding “a balance between the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”46 The teacher’s statements obviously related to matters 
of public concern.47 However, the Court concluded that the school had 
no more of a legitimate interest in restricting his speech than that of 
any other citizen because the letter did not undermine the 
performance of his teaching duties or otherwise interfere with the 
operation of the schools.48 But note the contrary implication: if school 
efficiency was affected, the employee might have had to give up 
certain speech rights in exchange for the job. 
 This implication was confirmed by Connick v. Myers,49 which 
involved a disgruntled assistant district attorney who circulated a 
questionnaire to fellow workers.50 The questions covered a variety of 
workplace issues: office transfer policy (her particular gripe), office 
morale, the need for a grievance committee, confidence in 
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in 
political campaigns.51 She was fired for insubordination.52 The Court 
attempted to draw a line between matters of public concern and 
                                                                                                                      
 40. For other lines of doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 86-87, 158-62. 
 41. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).  
 42. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
567 (1973); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947). 
 43. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
 44. Id. at 564.  
 45.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 46.  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 47.  See id. at 569. 
 48. Id. at 572-73.  
 49. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 50. Id. at 141.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
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“matters only of personal interest,” such as employee grievances.53 
With the possible exception of “the most unusual circumstances, a 
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the 
wisdom of a personnel decision” relating to employee grievances that 
lack public concern.54 Given the employee’s limited First Amendment 
interest, the supervisor did not have to put up with “action which he 
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his 
authority, and destroy close working relationships.”55 In contrast, a 
private citizen who spoke out about similar issues concerning the 
operation of a government office would have enjoyed complete First 
Amendment protection—there simply is no First Amendment 
exception that the government could invoke. 
 For our purposes, what is important is not the details of the 
doctrine but rather the core assumption of these cases that the 
government can condition employment on speech restrictions. That 
assumption can be expressed equally well by saying that individuals 
have default rights to free speech but can opt out of those rights in 
return for government employment. As the cases also make clear, 
however, the government’s ability to bargain for opt-outs in the 
employment context is not unlimited.56  
 What makes this example especially interesting is that the Court 
seemingly has never asked whether the employees waived their 
speech rights as an explicit part of their job contract. Rather, the 
assumption seems to be that speech rights are implicitly waived. 
Presumably, a government employment contract could provide more 
protection of speech than the Court requires; for example, by 
allowing employees to engage in campaign activities. But unless the 
contract contains such an explicit term, the Court appears to 
presume that the government has the right to regulate employee 
speech. Thus, employee speech is a particularly potent example of a 
default rule: free speech is a default right that an employee can 
                                                                                                                      
 53.  Id. at 147. 
 54. Id. Of the questions distributed by the employee, only the one about political 
campaigns was found to implicate any public concern: “the issue of whether assistant 
district attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the 
community upon which it is essential that public employees be able to speak out freely 
without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” Id. at 149. 
 55. Id. at 154. The Court concluded that the “questionnaire touched upon matters of 
public concern in only a most limited sense” and was “most accurately characterized as an 
employee grievance concerning internal office policy.” Id.  
 56. Id. at 147 (suggesting that the government may not bargain for a free speech opt-out 
when the political speech addresses matters of public concern).  
 Another First Amendment setting involving opt-outs is campaign finance. In Buckley v. 
Valeo, the Court held that the government cannot regulate the total level of a candidate’s 
spending. 424 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1976). However, it can impose a spending limit if the candidate 
agrees to accept public financing.  Id. at 90-104. 
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bargain away, and the default rule for government employment 
contracts is that the right has in fact been surrendered.  
C.   Abortion Rights 
 In Roe v. Wade,57 the Supreme Court held that a woman has a 
constitutional right to have an abortion, subject to some restrictions 
(particularly in the final trimester).58 But it turned out that the right 
to an abortion was a default rule: the government can provide 
benefits for women who choose not to exercise the right, thereby 
purchasing their waiver of the right to an abortion. In Maher v. Roe59 
and Harris v. McRae,60 the Court held that Congress could 
“encourage” women to bear children rather than have abortions by 
offering a financial inducement, such as payment of medical 
expenses for childbirth but not abortion.61 This holding was all the 
more remarkable because expanding the funding to include abortions 
would actually have saved the government money, inasmuch as 
abortions are a less expensive alternative.62 Thus, the only logical 
conclusion is that the government’s sole purpose was to discourage 
the exercise of a constitutional right. 
 The Court has also allowed use of government funding on the 
other side of the doctor-patient relationship—to induce physicians to 
remain silent about the abortion option as an alternative to 
childbirth. Rust v. Sullivan63 involved a restriction on abortion 
counseling.  A federal statute provided federal funding for family 
planning services but mandated that none of the funds be used in 
programs where abortion is a method of family planning.64 An 
implementing regulation provided that grantees could not refer 
women to abortion providers, even upon request, nor could grantees 
engage in lobbying or advocacy in favor of abortion.65 Finally, 
according to the regulation, any government-funded facilities had to 
be physically and financially separate from prohibited abortion 
activities; grantees that were not able to run stand-alone programs 
                                                                                                                      
 57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 58. Id. at 153-54.  
 59. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 60. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 61. See id. at 318; Maher, 432 U.S. at 476. 
 62. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 490 (The “state’s assertion that it saves money when it declines 
to pay the cost of a welfare mother’s abortion is simply contrary to undisputed facts.”).  
 63. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 64. Id.  
 65.  Id. at 179-80. 
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with their federal funds would be unable to use any other funds to 
advocate abortion.66  
 The Court upheld the regulations on the basis that they were 
merely designed to prevent program money from being used for 
purposes outside of its scope. “[H]ere the Government is not denying 
a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds 
be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”67 In short, 
although they were by no means government employees, the doctors’ 
speech rights were subject to the same kinds of limitations that the 
Court had upheld in cases such as Connick.68 In return for 
government funding, they gave up the right to communicate freely 
and candidly with their patients.69 
 The Court’s rulings on abortion-related funding restrictions have 
been particularly controversial. For present purposes, what is 
important is not so much the correctness (or incorrectness) of these 
decisions but their dramatic illustration of the government’s ability 
to obtain opt-outs from constitutional rights in return for financial 
benefits. 
D.   Criminal Procedure Rights 
 The Bill of Rights provides elaborate protections for potential 
criminal defendants. The police cannot engage in searches without 
probable cause;70 suspects cannot be forced to incriminate 
themselves;71 defendants are entitled to counsel, cross-examination of 
adverse witnesses, and compulsory process to obtain evidence in 
their own favor.72 As it turns out, all of these rights can be bartered 
away—and they usually are. 
 It is the rare criminal case that goes to trial. Criminal defendants 
typically enter into plea bargains, where they exchange a guilty plea 
for some concession by the prosecutor regarding sentencing. Far from 
being the norm, trials are now somewhat freakish exceptions from 
normal practice. Thus, the realities of criminal law are far removed 
from the criminal process familiar to most people. 
 The criminal process that law students study and television 
shows celebrate is formal, elaborate, and expensive. It involves 
                                                                                                                      
 66. Id. at 180-81. However, Justice O’Connor made a plausible argument in her 
dissent that the regulation went beyond the agency’s statutory authority. Id. at 223-24 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 196 (majority opinion). 
 68. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 
49-56. 
 69. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199.  
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 71. Id. amend. V.  
 72. Id. amend. VI.  
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detailed examination of witnesses and physical evidence, tough 
adversarial argument from attorneys for the government and 
defense, and fair-minded decisionmaking from an impartial judge 
and jury. For the vast majority of cases in the real world, the 
criminal process includes none of these things. Trials occur only 
occasionally—in some jurisdictions, they amount to only one-
fiftieth of total dispositions. Most cases are disposed of by means 
that seem scandalously casual: a quick conversation in a 
prosecutor’s office or a courthouse hallway between attorneys 
familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses 
present, leading to a proposed resolution that is then “sold” to both 
the defendant and the judge.73  
In short, plea bargaining is “not some adjunct to the criminal justice 
system; it is the criminal justice system.”74 
 By entering into plea bargains, defendants automatically waive 
some important constitutional rights. In particular, they obviously 
forfeit the right to a jury trial as well as the right to confront the 
witnesses against them. Other criminal procedure rights are also 
subject to opt-out through plea bargaining or other mechanisms. A 
partial listing of waivable rights would include the following: 
(1)  The right to appeal;75 
(2) The right to sue law enforcement officials for civil rights 
violations;76 
(3) The right to have counsel present during an interrogation77 
even if the prisoner is kept ignorant of critical information, such as 
the fact that a lawyer has already been retained to represent him 
and is seeking to speak with him;78 
(4) The Fourth Amendment right to demand a search warrant, 
which is waived by voluntary consent to search,79 even if the  
individual is unaware that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise 
forbid the search;80 
(5) The right to be represented by counsel at trial.81 
                                                                                                                      
 73. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 
1909, 1911-12 (1992). 
 74. Id. at 1912. 
 75. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1990) (finding that the 
defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal). 
 76. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (finding that the 
defendant’s voluntary waiver of his right to sue under § 1983 was valid). 
 77. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).  
 78. Id. at 425 (refusing to adopt a rule that would require police to “inform a suspect 
of an attorney’s efforts to reach him”).   
 79. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“[O]ne of the specifically 
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a 
search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). 
 80. Id. at 227.  
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 The Supreme Court seems to have limited concern about criminal 
procedure opt-outs, particularly in the context of plea bargaining. 
Rather, the Court has spoken favorably, if perhaps unrealistically, 
about the “give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining 
between the prosecution and the defense, which arguably possess 
relatively equal bargaining power.”82 Indeed, the Court has 
applauded plea bargaining as “an essential component of the 
administration of justice.”83 The Court added that if “[p]roperly 
administered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged.”84 
 Thus, it is clear the criminal procedure guarantees of the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are by no means inalienable rights. 
They are all subject to opt-out. From a practical point of view, their 
primary significance is that they serve as bargaining chips in 
negotiating the terms of a guilty plea. Indeed, in practice, these 
bargaining chips may be more useful to defense counsel for seeking 
favorable terms than for the possibility of presenting evidence of 
innocence.85 
III.   THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
 Now that we have seen that virtually every constitutional right 
may be bartered away in certain situations, we need to consider the 
restrictions placed by courts on these exchanges. These restrictions 
go under the rubric of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
However, the doctrine is in a state of some confusion, and 
commentators have been unable to supply an acceptable substitute. 
A.   A Doctrinal Mess 
 The Supreme Court’s difficulties in dealing with the problem of 
unconstitutional conditions can be seen in a series of recent First 
Amendment cases. It is clear enough that the government cannot jail 
someone for expressing an idea the government dislikes, but can the 
government condition some benefit on the applicant’s abstention 
from undesirable expression? The answer is “maybe.” The Court has 
struggled without success to formulate a coherent test for answering 
this question.  
                                                                                                                      
 81. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (finding that the defendant in a 
state criminal trial may voluntarily and intelligently elect to proceed without counsel). 
 82. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978); see also Parker v. North 
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 83. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1997). 
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 We have already seen one case in this area, Rust v. Sullivan (the 
abortion-counseling case).86 Rust seemed to create a straightforward 
germaneness test: the government could impose restrictions on 
speech provided those restrictions were related to the purpose of the 
government funding.87 But Rust was not the Court’s final word on the 
subject of speech-related funding restrictions. 
 A second case, Rosenberger v. Rector,88 reflects the Court’s 
continued difficulty with this problem. The University of Virginia 
used mandatory student fees to finance the costs of printing various 
student publications.89 It excluded religious speech from the program 
because of Establishment Clause concerns.90 The Court might well 
have upheld the Virginia program on the basis of Rust, 
characterizing the overall purpose of the program as encouraging 
nonsecular student speech (just as in Rust it characterized the 
program as encouraging nonabortion reproductive services). Instead, 
the majority decided that the restriction involved impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination and distinguished Rust as a case where the 
government was essentially paying doctors to speak as its agents 
rather than subsidizing private speech.91 (The doctors at Planned 
Parenthood and other clinics would have been surprised to learn that 
they were in the business of transmitting government propaganda 
rather than providing medical advice.) Thus, Rosenberger seemed to 
adopt a particularly crabbed reading of Rust, taking a 
correspondently narrow view of the government’s power to condition 
benefits on speech restrictions. 
 In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,92 the Court came close to 
disavowing Rust altogether in favor of a decidedly more skeptical 
attitude toward government funding conditions. The Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC) was established as a nonprofit corporation to 
distribute federal funds to local legal aid organizations for the poor.93 
Velazquez involved a condition on the use of LSC funds, prohibiting 
grant recipients from challenging the validity of welfare laws.94 As 
interpreted by the government, the statute barred a legal aid lawyer 
from arguing in court that a state law conflicted with federal law or 
that either a state or federal statute was unconstitutional.95  Lawyers 
could, however, argue that a welfare agency made a factual mistake 
                                                                                                                      
 86. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 87. Id. at 199-200.  
 88. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 89. Id. at 823-25.  
 90. Id. at 826-27. 
 91. Id. at 833.  
 92. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 93. Id. at 536. 
 94. Id. at 536-37.  
 95. Id. at 537.  
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or misapplied an existing welfare statute.96 When an issue of 
constitutional or statutory validity arose after a case was underway, 
LSC advised that its attorneys must withdraw.97 The restriction 
applied to all of the grantee’s activities, including those funded from 
other sources.98 
 Not surprisingly, both the government and the four dissenters 
thought the case was controlled by Rust.99 Their theory was that the 
government had chosen to create a program for routine welfare 
disputes, not law reform litigation. But the majority, in an opinion by 
Justice Kennedy, gave Rust a very restricted reading. Although he 
admitted that “[t]he Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance” on 
this rationale,100 Kennedy viewed Rust as involving speech by the 
government itself, rather than financing of private speech activities.101 
The crucial point was that, like the program in Rosenberger but unlike 
the program in Rust, “the LSC program was designed to facilitate 
private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”102 Kennedy 
added that the “private nature of the speech involved here, and the 
extent of LSC’s regulation of private expression, are indicated further 
by the circumstance that the Government seeks to use an existing 
medium of expression and to control it, in a class of cases, in ways 
which distort its usual functioning.”103 Moreover, “[b]y seeking to 
prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate 
presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits 
speech and expression upon which the courts must depend for the 
proper exercise of the judicial power.”104 
 Just when it seemed that Rust had been more or less limited to its 
facts, the Court gave signs of changing course yet again. In United 
States v. American Library Ass’n,105 the Court upheld a federal 
statute that required libraries to use Internet filters to limit access to 
sexually explicit material in exchange for federal funding. The 
plurality relied squarely on Rust and distinguished Velasquez:  
 The [Velasquez] Court concluded that the restriction on 
advocacy in such welfare disputes would distort the usual 
functioning of the legal profession and the federal and state courts 
before which the lawyers appeared. Public libraries, by contrast, 
have no comparable role that pits them against the Government, 
                                                                                                                      
 96. Id. at 538-39.  
 97. Id. at 539.  
 98. Id. at 551.  
 99. Id. at 552-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 100. Id. at 541 (majority opinion).  
 101. Id. at 541-42.  
 102. Id. at 542. 
 103. Id. at 543. 
 104. Id. at 545.  
 105. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
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and there is no comparable assumption that they must be free of 
any conditions that their benefactors might attach to the use of 
donated funds or other assistance.106 
Clearly, the Court has not yet settled on a solution to the problem of 
funding conditions on free speech. 
B.   Theoretical Confusion 
 As one author recently noted, “Because of its wildly inconsistent 
application by the Supreme Court, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in recent 
years.”107 A quick survey of some of the major scholarship reveals how 
far we are from any consensus about the foundations of the doctrine or 
how it should operate. Consider the works of four leading theorists. 
 The first theorist, Richard Epstein, suggests that bargains 
between the government and citizens should be disallowed when 
there is a defect in the bargaining situation.108 One possible defect of 
bargaining is the government’s exploitation of its monopoly power.109 
Another is a “divide and conquer” strategy by the government, in 
which it makes separate deals that make sense to each individual 
separately, but collectively make society worse off.110 The idea is that 
the government should not be able to use its bargaining position to 
deprive individuals of their entitlements. For example, it would seem 
to follow from Epstein’s analysis that Rust v. Sullivan111 might go the 
other way if the government had attained a monopoly by becoming 
the sole provider of health care. In that situation, if the right to an 
abortion is to have any meaning at all, abortions (not to mention 
abortion counseling) must be available from government doctors.112 
 A contrasting view of unconstitutional conditions is taken by Seth 
Kreimer.113 He attempts to distinguish between denying a benefit and 
imposing a penalty.114 In his view, a benefit should not be considered 
                                                                                                                      
 106. Id. at 213. The two concurring opinions did not find it necessary to reach this 
issue. They concluded that the ability of patrons to have the library turn off the filter made 
the restriction too insubstantial to raise serious constitutional problems. 
 107. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional 
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 914. 
 108. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term Foreword: Unconstitutional 
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-28 (1988). 
 109. Id. at 21-22.  
 110. Id. at 26.  
 111. See supra Part III.A. 
 112. Epstein’s effort obviously bears a family resemblance to the default rule analysis 
offered in this Article. It differs in some critical respects, however—it focuses on a limited 
subset of the possible flaws in the bargaining process, and it purports to offer the definitive 
treatment rather than an additional perspective on the problem. 
 113. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984). 
 114. Id. at 1352-59.  
930  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:913 
 
“largesse” if the government would offer the benefit anyway even 
without the condition—to put it another way, if receiving the benefit is 
“normal” rather than a government favor.115 Under Kreimer’s analysis, 
the government’s failure to fund abortions might be considered either 
a penalty or a refusal to provide a subsidy, depending on the 
circumstances.116 If only a few medical procedures are financed by the 
government, exclusion of abortion is not invidious and should not be 
considered a penalty. On the other hand, if most medical procedures 
other than abortion are government-financed, exclusion of abortion 
looks much more like a penalty. 
 Kathleen Sullivan’s theory focuses on distributive issues in 
identifying the evils of unconstitutional conditions.117 First, she argues, 
government benefits may crowd out the private sector, so that the 
government becomes the exclusive source of support and thereby gains 
control of individual behavior.118 This is similar to Epstein’s concern 
about monopoly power. Second, the government may redistribute 
power by extending benefits only to favored groups, as when the 
government offers tax benefits to Republicans but not Democrats.119 
Third, if benefits are made available only to the poor, who are then 
encouraged to waive their constitutional rights, the result is to leave 
constitutional rights distributed according to a hierarchy.120 One 
message of Sullivan’s analysis is that funding conditions on welfare for 
the poor are particularly suspect, since they may result in creating 
constitutional second-class citizens, who not only have fewer material 
goods than others but also fewer basic rights.121 
 In contrast to these other three theorists, Cass Sunstein argues 
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should not exist 
because the validity of a condition should be decided by direct 
reference to the underlying constitutional guarantee rather than by 
some general doctrine.122 In other words, we should not have any 
general rule about when conduct can be the subject of a funding 
condition but not a criminal penalty; instead, the result should 
depend on the particular constitutional provision in question.123 For 
example, whether the government could selectively fund childbirth 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 1359-78.  
 116. See id.   
 117. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 
(1989). 
 118. Id. at 1492-96. For more about the question of crowding-out, see infra text 
accompanying notes 142-46. 
 119. Sullivan, supra note 117, at 1496-97.  
 120. Id. at 1497-99.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism 
(with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 604-09 
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 123. Id. at 603-04.  
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but not abortion should depend on whether Roe was best read as 
creating only a duty of government noncoercion or a right to 
government neutrality on abortion.124 Sunstein seems right in 
viewing the nature of the particular constitutional provision as 
relevant, but perhaps unduly pessimistic about the possibility of 
finding any useful guidelines that extend beyond each specific right. 
For example, standard defects in the bargaining process may be 
grounds for invalidation regardless of the type of right involved. 
 These eminent theorists do not seem to agree on much of 
anything. Nor has their work done anything to settle the debate,125 as 
shown by more recent writings in the field.126 This does not, by any 
means, imply that their perspectives lack value. Indeed, each theory 
is plausible in certain contexts but seems to explain only part of the 
puzzle persuasively. One problem may be that there are actually 
multiple restrictions on bargaining over constitutional rights; 
theories that explain some restrictions may not work for others. 
Thus, it may be a mistake to assume that a single test should govern 
all unconstitutional conditions. On the other hand, there may be 
more structural coherence than Sunstein acknowledges. At the very 
least, trying another line of attack on the problem seems warranted. 
IV.   CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS DEFAULT RULES 
 The notion that constitutional rights might be something like the 
default rules in contract law may well seem counterintuitive. This 
section is intended to show that drawing this connection is less 
contrived and more fruitful than it might appear at first blush. As we 
will see, viewing rights as contractual defaults suggests a variety of 
new insights. 
A.   The Theory of Default Rules 
 Most rules of contract law can be varied by agreement of the 
parties. For this reason, they are best seen as defaults. They fill gaps 
in the contract in the same way that default settings provide 
premade choices for users who do not wish to make their own 
judgments. For example, article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Id. at 615-20.  For a similar argument that Rust is really a case about the abortion 
rights of patients rather than the speech rights of doctors, see infra text accompanying 
notes 141-43. 
 125. See Berman, supra note 5, at 5 (“[T]hese efforts, and those by other distinguished 
scholars, have left most observers unpersuaded.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1184 (1990); Brooks R. Fudenberg, 
Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 371 (1995); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument That the Greater 
Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227. 
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contains numerous provisions that apply in the absence of a contrary 
agreement of the parties. These default terms include price, delivery, 
payment, warranties, and remedies.127 Similarly, sovereign immunity 
is a default term in contracts between the states and their creditors, 
but it can be displaced by an agreement to the contrary.  
 The choice of default can be important for several reasons. First, 
the default rule may be sticky because of transaction costs. If so, as a 
practical matter, it could have much the same effect as a mandatory 
rule.128 In the constitutional setting, this is often the case, if only 
because the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits 
renegotiation. In the absence of any transaction costs or restrictions 
on bargains, the Coase Theorem would make the initial assignment 
of rights all but irrelevant. For the uninitiated, the Coase Theorem 
holds that in the absence of transaction costs, the parties will always 
bargain to an economically efficient outcome.129  Except for possible 
distributional effects, it would not matter whether the state had to 
pay individuals to obtain waivers or whether the individuals had to 
pay the state to obtain rights. Transaction costs are far from 
negligible in many situations, however, so the default rule may be 
decisive. 
 Defaults can also be important where bargaining around them is 
feasible because the choice of the default may determine the number 
of people who need to engage in this bargaining and, hence, the 
amount of social resources devoted to avoiding the default rule.130 It 
would probably be foolish to make unrestricted employee speech the 
default rule if most agencies and their employees would prefer 
another arrangement, since they would be needlessly forced to 
negotiate the issue. 
 Default rules can also serve information-forcing functions. Some 
analysts view this as an argument for setting default rules that most 
parties do not want in order to cure information asymmetries by 
forcing disclosure.131 For example, a default rule limiting 
consequential damages may not actually fit the preferences of the 
majority of contracting parties. However, without such a rule, buyers 
might fail to notify sellers of their particular situation because they 
would be assured of obtaining compensation if anything went wrong 
with the performance.132 A default rule limiting consequential 
                                                                                                                      
 127. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204, -305, -308, -309 (2005).  
 128. Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. 
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damages creates an incentive for these buyers to reveal their needs 
to the seller.133 In turn, this information allows sellers to raise their 
price in exchange for the risk of higher damages, as well as signaling 
to them that they should take special precautions against breach. 
The penalty default forces information disclosure in a particular way 
that may have little application to constitutional law, but the more 
general problem of information asymmetry may be more relevant. 
 Potentially, any legal rule that is subject to variation by one or 
more parties can be considered a default rule.134 After all, most legal 
rules are subject to some kind of voluntary modification. Even an 
inalienable right can be, in effect, broadened by agreement, though it 
cannot be narrowed. Assuming, for example, that the right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment is inalienable, it is still possible 
for the government to voluntarily provide even greater protection 
against harsh punishments by statute. Thus, from the perspective of a 
contract theorist, constitutional law teems with contract default rules.  
 From a less sympathetic perspective, the contract theorist may 
seem to be in the position of the person who owns only a hammer and 
therefore sees everything in the world as a nail. Whether this 
criticism is well founded depends on which particular problems can 
be effectively “hammered” with this particular theoretical tool. The 
best way to find that out is to make the attempt. That at least is the 
current endeavor—to find out to what extent a particular set of 
doctrinal problems can be effectively knocked into place with default 
theory. If contract theory can help illuminate the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions, so much the better. If not, we can at 
least learn more about how waivers of constitutional rights differ 
from contractual undertakings. 
B.   Benefits of Applying Default Rule Theory 
 The plea bargaining context illustrates some of the analytic 
traction that can be gained through viewing constitutional rights as 
default rules. In a seminal article, Robert Scott and Bill Stuntz 
argued that plea bargaining fits the normal paradigm of contract 
law, contrary to the claims of some other scholars.135 What is perhaps 
more interesting is that they also concluded that the bargaining 
process is badly flawed: 
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Bargaining defendants are, in effect, purchasing insurance from 
prosecutors, insurance against the risk of conviction and a high 
post-trial sentence. The pool of defendants includes high-cost 
insureds (guilty defendants whose conviction is extremely likely) 
and low-cost insureds (including innocent defendants whose 
conviction is much less likely). But the latter cannot effectively 
separate themselves from the former. They therefore must either 
buy the high-cost insurance or else self-insure by going to trial. 
Because of risk aversion, many of them will likely buy the 
insurance notwithstanding its high price, leading to a 
misallocation of criminal punishment.136 
The authors then make several suggestions to improve the process, 
such as empowering prosecutors to agree to binding caps and 
providing safeguards against pleas carrying abnormally high 
sentences.137 
 As that article indicates, viewing rights as contractual defaults 
opens up a new set of questions about an arguably unconstitutional 
condition by leading to an inquiry about how the bargaining process 
might be flawed.138 Such flaws can take multiple forms: transaction 
costs, information asymmetries, cognitive defects such as over-
reliance on heuristic reasoning, exclusion of third parties whose 
interests are also affected, or the presence of monopoly power.139 In 
considering potentially unconstitutional conditions, we can fruitfully 
begin to ask whether particular bargains should be blocked because 
of these flaws. 
 For example, contract theory may help explain why we do not 
allow advance waiver of some constitutional rights, though we do 
allow advance waiver of others. A suspect can waive her right to a 
jury trial in return for a lower sentence. It seems very unlikely, 
however, that the Court would uphold a system whereby individuals 
waived their jury rights in advance in exchange for guaranteed 
sentence reductions in the event they were ever tried for a crime. It 
is easy to see why we might be suspicious of such bargains on 
ordinary contractual grounds: ordinary citizens have much less 
information than the government about the possible utility of jury 
trials and their likely sentences. In addition, people are notoriously 
bad at processing probabilistic information. For much the same 
reasons, consumer waivers of remedies for defective goods are often 
considered unconscionable. In contrast, we do allow states to waive 
their Eleventh Amendment rights in advance of any claim being 
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brought; presumably the states are advised by counsel and able to 
calculate their possible litigation exposure. Rather than being 
analogous to consumers, states are more like merchants who are able 
to bargain for themselves. 
 Externalities provide another reason for blocking bargains. The 
externality problem is particularly significant in the First 
Amendment area, since speech is protected in part because of its 
potential benefit to the public. The speech most likely to create these 
positive externalities is that on subjects of public concern. This may 
explain why the government has limited opt-outs by employees for 
speech of public concern but not for other types of speech, which do 
not create such externalities.140 
 Third-party effects are at the center of some of the best-known 
unconstitutional conditions cases. Rather than dealing with rights 
holders, the government can make deals with intermediaries who 
provide assistance in exercising the right. This may have efficiency 
benefits because fewer transactions costs arise, but it can also be 
harmful because the intermediary may not fully represent the 
interests of the rights holders. For example, suppose the government 
were to enter into contracts with paper manufacturers, in which 
those manufacturers agreed to supply only certain publishers. The 
resulting bargain would not necessarily reflect the full interests of 
publishers as a group or of their readers. 
 The Court has recognized these third-party interests to some 
extent by policing bargains more carefully when these interests are 
stronger. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court said the 
following: 
[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of 
free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society 
that the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere 
by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government 
funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of 
the First Amendment.141 
 Ironically, the Court ignored the existence of important third-
party interests in Rust itself.142 In Rust, the government contracted 
with doctors to fail to disclose information to women who might 
desire abortions.143 The doctors may or may not have been in a 
position to fully represent the interests of pregnant women, 
                                                                                                                      
 140. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991). 
 141. 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991). 
 142. See id. at 179.  
 143. See id. (“[A] Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abor-
tion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family 
planning.”).  
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especially if the effect of the government subsidy is to reduce the 
availability of abortion information from other sources. Whether this 
decrease in abortion information actually takes place is a 
complicated question, which depends partly on whether the option of 
partitioning the government-funded activities is possible and partly 
on whether the presence of the government-subsidized services 
“crowds out” other charitable and for-profit services that might 
otherwise enter the market. The ultimate question, then, is whether 
the funding condition indirectly restricts the availability of abortions, 
in which case it violates the constitutional rights of patients. 
 Similarly, in Velasquez, the major question is whether the ability 
of poor people to raise legal claims is impaired because of such 
crowding out effects.144 Perhaps, if government-subsidized legal aid 
did not exist, there would be much more private support for legal aid, 
which would include law reform litigation. A secondary question is 
whether the third-party effect on the operation of the courts raises 
separation of powers issues, since the courts are deprived of full 
argumentation by counsel in some cases.145  Another way of looking 
at the issue would be to suggest that the regulation burdened the 
right of private donors to support legal aid, to the extent that the 
government had succeeded in limiting their choices to legal service 
providers who eschew law reform litigation.146 But this is a tricky 
question. Perhaps, without the government aid, there would be no 
lawyers to represent indigent clients with constitutional claims 
anyway. Or, maybe the availability of government aid for routine 
claims will actually increase funding for private groups that are 
willing to turn down government aid in order to advance 
constitutional claims. We would need to do more empirical evidence 
to determine whether the government program will crowd out 
private funding for constitutional claims. 
 Apart from these third-party effects, we may also want to block 
certain transactions because they either create or destroy 
information undesirably. Plea bargaining may suppress information 
about guilt or innocence, “pooling” the two types of defendants in a 
way that we might find undesirable.147 We may also object to a 
certain “separating” equilibrium.148 A classic example is provided by 
                                                                                                                      
 144. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546-47 (2000). 
 145. See id. at 545-46.  
 146. One reason for the crowding out might be increasing returns to scale in the 
provision of legal services. It may be more efficient to have one large legal aid office rather 
than a number of small ones, in which case the government-subsidized service could 
dominate the market. 
 147. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 73, at 1911, 1935-40. 
 148. A pooling equilibrium is one in which different types of actors all enter the same 
contract; a separating equilibrium is one where the different types opt for different 
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the use of loyalty oaths as a condition for government benefits. Apart 
from its other possible flaws, this mechanism allows the government 
to create a separating equilibrium in which loyalists take the oath 
and dissenters do not. We might well think that this is information 
that the government is not entitled to obtain.149 This provides an 
explanation for why we reject some conditions on benefits, even when 
deprivation of the benefits is not injurious enough to be coercive in 
any sense. 
 In some situations, however, constitutional rights may serve a 
beneficial signaling function. For example, by offering to agree 
voluntarily to a police search, a person sends a somewhat credible 
signal of innocence.150 It is possible that in many situations 
(particularly where the search would not be highly intrusive), the 
majority of people would agree to the search. In those settings, the 
Fourth Amendment protection against search can be seen as 
functioning like a penalty default, producing the revelation of useful 
information even though most people actually have no objection to a 
search. However, this information forcing comes at a cost, since the 
effect is to penalize individuals who are not guilty but have other 
reasons to protect their privacy. Similarly, a well-functioning plea 
bargaining system could allow defendants to signal their innocence 
by demanding trials.  
 Contract theory also suggests that we might want to focus more 
on the form of the contract, and in particularly on whether it is a 
                                                                                                                      
contract terms, thereby revealing their type. See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Financial Instruments: 
Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 399, 414 (2003). 
 149. Note that this objection is quite different from the classic coercion worry about 
unconstitutional conditions. The separating equilibrium works best if the government 
benefit is not too large (and thus not too likely to overcome the contrary preferences of 
objectors). A major benefit may lead dissenters to reluctantly take the oath, raising both 
coercion and autonomy concerns, but spoiling the separation mechanisms. A smaller 
benefit is better in terms of collecting information about political views because dissenters 
will be more likely to forgo it in order to avoid the loyalty oath. Of course, there has to be 
some benefit or otherwise loyalists may not bother taking the oath either. Thus, a medium-
sized benefit is the best from the government’s point of view, and the most constitutionally 
objectionable from this perspective.  
 150. If the police always believed this signal, they would never actually take advantage 
of the consent and would never search anyone who gave consent even if they had grounds 
for doing so, which would give criminals a strong incentive to consent in order to avoid a 
search. On the other hand, since conducting a search is time-consuming, police have an 
incentive to avoid searching where they think it would be fruitless, even if they have 
permission. In addition, if asking for consent is relatively costless, the police may often ask 
for consent just as a test when they have no desire to conduct a search; if consent is 
refused, the individual becomes more suspect and is investigated further. Here, requests 
for consent function as a screening device. The equilibrium would seem to involve consent 
mostly by innocent people but also some guilty, with policing sometimes searching and 
often declining to do so. This provides another explanation (besides police perjury) for why 
some voluntary searches disclose contraband—the suspect was gambling that the officer 
was not actually interested in searching or that giving permission to search would be a 
sufficient sign of innocence to head off an actual search. 
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contract of adhesion. Adhesion contracts are take-it-or-leave-it offers 
to consumers, and they have been subject to somewhat greater 
supervision than other types of contracts.151 There is some indication 
that this attitude carries over to the constitutional arena—or, in 
other words, that the courts will be more likely to uphold bargained-
for conditions than those unilaterally demanded by the government.  
 Some support for this idea might be gleaned from National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,152 where the Court upheld a 
content-based funding program for the arts.153 A 1990 statute 
required grants to artists be judged by “artistic merit,” “taking into 
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the 
diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”154 The statute was 
passed in response to complaints about two provocative works that 
were partially funded by the program.155 The National Endowment 
for the Arts implemented the decency requirement by merely 
requiring that advisory councils which review grant applications 
“represent geographic, ethnic, and esthetic diversity.”156 In an opinion 
by Justice O’Connor, the Court readily accepted the criterion of 
artistic merit.157 O’Connor also concluded that the statute’s vague, 
subjective standards were acceptable given the inherent difficulty of 
judging grant applications and that they did not pose any specific 
threat of viewpoint regulation.158 The Court seemed comforted by the 
fact that these standards did not establish any categorical grounds 
for exclusion.159  
 Government funding for the arts raises some vexing conceptual 
issues under the First Amendment, and there is certainly more than 
one way to read the Finley case. It seems doubtful, however, that the 
Court would have been equally willing to uphold a statute that made 
“decency” a flat condition for funding. What the statute did instead 
was to make decency a relevant consideration to artists in framing 
grant applications and to government panels in reviewing them.160 
                                                                                                                      
 151. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174-77 (1983). 
 152. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 153. Id. at 590.  
 154. Id. at 572. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)). 
 155. Id. at 574.  
 156. Id. at 577. 
 157. Id. at 584.  
 158. Id. at 589.  In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia argued that 
exclusion from a subsidy program is not coercive and that viewpoint discrimination is 
therefore always permissible except when the government has established a public forum. 
Id. at 590-600 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Souter dissented on the ground that the 
statute was adopted because the government disapproved of the messages of certain 
artists. Id. at 600-03 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 159. Id. at 581 (majority opinion).  
 160. See id. at 572 (quoting the statute as requiring panels to take decency “into con-
sideration”).  
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Thus, it allowed artists to make a low degree of offensiveness part of 
their offers and allowed the government to view this aspect of offers 
favorably.161  One way of expressing this aspect of the case is to say 
that the government was not allowed to provide a contract of 
adhesion, which would have allowed artists to obtain funding only if 
they agreed to this term. Instead, decency became a subject for 
implicit bargaining between the parties, and the Court apparently 
found this less objectionable.162  
 There is some reason to believe that a similar dynamic holds in 
the land use area. For example, the Washington Supreme Court 
rejected an attack on a development condition:  
King County presented Trimen [the developer] with a viable 
choice—dedicate or reserve land for open space, or pay a fee in lieu 
of dedication. Trimen negotiated a reduced fee in lieu of dedication 
for both developments. King County accepted the reduced fees and 
Trimen paid the fees without protest. Given the record before us, 
we conclude that Trimen voluntarily paid the fee in lieu of 
dedication or reservation of land.163 
Similarly, California has resisted challenges to exactions that were 
accepted by the landowner without a contemporaneous challenge.164 
 Another example of the Court’s preference for bargained 
exchanges rather than adhesion contracts is its rhetoric when 
discussing plea bargains. Recall that the Supreme Court has spoken 
favorably, if perhaps unrealistically, about the “give-and-take 
negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and 
defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining 
power.”165 The implication seems to be that adhesion contracts might 
not receive such judicial favor.  
                                                                                                                      
 161. More precisely, what it did was to allow the government to staff the review 
committees with some people who would be likely to favor proposals of this kind. 
 162. See id. at 590 (holding that since the statute “merely add[ed] some imprecise con-
siderations to an already subjective selection process,” it did not “impermissibly infringe on 
First or Fifth Amendment Rights”).   
 163. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 193 (Wash. 1994). 
 164. See Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that the failure of owner’s predecessor in interest to challenge permit conditions meant 
that the current owner’s claim is time-barred); Wolverton Assocs. v. Official Creditors’ 
Comm., 909 F.2d 1286, 1297 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that “enjoyment of the benefits of 
a conditional use permit bars a landowner or his successor in interest from challenging any 
conditions that the permit requires”); see also County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d 
14, 17 (Cal. 1977) (both the benefits and burdens of a conditional use permit run with the 
land, binding successors); Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State, 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 660-61 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989) (landowner forfeited its inverse compensation claim by complying with 
permit conditions). California also requires permit conditions to be challenged promptly, 
further limiting the possibility of opportunism by someone who has agreed to those 
conditions. Travis v. County of Santa Cruz, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404, 409 (2004). 
 165. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting Parker v. North 
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)). 
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 The Court is correct that plea bargaining is not inherently 
objectionable and that individualized bargaining between attorneys on 
both sides helps ensure the fairness of the bargain. Yet, the bargaining 
process is troubling for two other reasons. First, increasingly 
draconian sentencing schemes may leave even innocent defendants 
with little choice but to plead guilty.166 Second, overworked public 
defenders may be unable to effectively represent the interests of their 
clients in bargaining; they also have a conflict of interest regarding 
any individual client since full representation of that client would 
require skimping even further on the interests of others. More sensible 
sentencing and fuller funding for public defenders would go a long way 
to improve plea bargaining, reinforcing the individualized give-and-
take that the Court seems to favor. 
 Preferring bargained-for exchanges to adhesion contracts 
promotes party autonomy—a central purpose of constitutional rights. 
However, a countervailing factor does exist. Bargaining results in ad 
hoc bargains, which may depend on differences in an individual’s 
need for benefits or in their bargaining skills. Thus, uniform 
contracts of adhesion are preferable in terms of equality interests. 
The importance of these equality interests may vary between 
constitutional rights—for example, the Court has spoken of the 
Takings Clause as being designed to avoid singling out particular 
property owners.167 In contrast, while equality may be an important 
First Amendment norm, it is quixotic to expect government funding 
of the arts to favor all applicants equally.168  
 Thus, even apart from the greater efficiency of adhesion contracts, 
courts sometimes have reasons to favor uniformity of contract terms. 
Arms-length bargains may be favored as opposed to adhesion 
contracts. But courts may also prefer legislation that requires 
uniform treatment of all offerees over individually tailored contracts 
when a strong equality interest is involved. In short, arms-length 
bargaining may be preferable in terms of the interests of the parties, 
but they may raise equal protection concerns.  
V.   RETHINKING SUBSTANTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGE 
 Bargains to surrender constitutional rights are subject to two 
substantive limitations that have little parallel in private law. One is 
the “germaneness” requirement, which in effect limits the currency 
the government can use to purchase a particular right. Another is 
                                                                                                                     
 166. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 73, at 1948. 
 167. See Justice O’Connor’s recent opinion in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 
528, 537 (2005). 
 168. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); see also text ac-
companying notes 152-62. 
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the willingness of courts to inquire into the fairness of the exchange, 
a type of price control that courts virtually eschew in private law. 
 Contract theory provides two important insights about these 
restrictions. First, whatever the reasons for these restrictions might 
be, they have little to do with standard contractual concerns such as 
duress or unconscionability. These restrictions are inefficient in that 
they block bargains that both the government and the other party 
would truly prefer. This is not to say, however, that other normative 
objections to these bargains may not exist. Second, regardless of the 
reasons for these restrictions, they raise significant enforcement 
problems. They are difficult to police and require courts to second-
guess the preferences of the parties. Given these problems, if the 
nonefficiency goals are considered important, we ought to consider 
whether there are more effective ways of pursuing them.  
 The best that can be said for nexus requirements is that the 
complete absence of germaneness may be an indicator of improper 
government motivation. Trying to make fine-grained distinctions 
between degrees of germaneness, however, is not only a thankless 
task but is unlikely to shed much light on government motivation. 
Policing the proportionality of the bargain is an even less useful 
undertaking. 
A.   Germaneness Requirement 
 The Supreme Court has been at some pains to restrict the 
currency with which the government can purchase waivers from 
rights holders. The essential concept is that the right must have 
some logical connection with the compensation. Perhaps the most 
intuitive way to look at this doctrine is to start with the government 
program and then view the doctrine as limiting the conditions that 
can be placed on that program. From this point, every government 
benefit is linked with a set of rights that can be validly made 
conditional on the benefit. Although it is less intuitive, we can also 
flip the concept and say that any given right can only be “purchased” 
by the government as a condition for receiving a limited class of 
benefits that have some logical connection with the right. From this 
point of view, each right is linked with a set of benefits. Thus, the 
germaneness standard requires that any given right be purchased 
with a limited type of “currency” bearing a logical relationship to the 
right. For example, abortion-related rights can be purchased only 
with reproductive-related benefits. It is almost as if we could 
purchase sushi only with yen, and crepe suzettes only with euros. 
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 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission169 illustrates this concept. 
The owners of beachfront property in California sought a permit to 
demolish a dilapidated bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom 
house.170 The permit was granted subject to the condition that the 
owners record an easement allowing the public to cross their property 
in order to reach the beach.171 The government’s theory was that the 
new construction would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, 
creating a psychological barrier to beach access.172 Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court first concluded that obtaining the easement 
outright would be a taking that would require payment of just 
compensation.173 He then asked “whether requiring it to be conveyed 
as a condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome.”174 
 In analyzing this question, Justice Scalia explicitly assumed that 
the government could have denied the permit altogether based on the 
visual impact of the house.175 He also agreed that the government’s 
“power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the 
public’s view of the beach must surely include the power to condition 
construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of 
property rights, that serves the same end.”176 Yet without such a 
“nexus,” a permit condition would not be a “valid regulation of land 
use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’ ”177 Indeed, Justice Scalia 
argued that allowing such unrelated conditions on permits would 
actually undermine the accomplishment of legitimate land use goals: 
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of 
the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use 
regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other 
purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals 
purportedly sought to be served than would result from more 
lenient (but nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, the 
importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only does 
not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating 
the prohibition, but positively militates against the practice.178 
 In Nollan, the Court found no plausible connection between the 
alleged impact on ocean viewing and the requirement of an access 
                                                                                                                      
 169. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 170. Id. at 828. 
 171. Id. The public already had the right to reach the ocean by walking along the beach 
from other access points.  Id.   
 172. Id. at 828-29. 
 173. Id. at 831, 834.  
 174. Id. at 834. 
 175. Id. at 836.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 837 (internal citations omitted). 
 178. Id. at 837 n.5. 
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easement.179 Such a connection must be a “substantial” one where an 
actual conveyance of property is involved, “since in that context there 
is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.”180 One 
oddity of Nollan is that the Court said that a perpendicular easement 
(from the street to the beach) would have had the required nexus, but 
not a parallel easement (along the beach itself).181 If the question is 
the government’s good faith versus improper motivation, this kind of 
hair-splitting is unlikely to prove much. 
 Nollan seems to be an unusually strict interpretation of the 
germaneness requirements. South Dakota v. Dole182 is probably more 
typical. In Dole, Congress withheld certain highway funding from 
any state that allowed eighteen-year-olds to purchase alcohol.183 The 
Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed Prohibition, seems rather 
clearly to give states the right to set their own rules in such matters. 
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute.184 The Court rejected the 
claim that the Constitution forbids the use of the spending power to 
accomplish objectives that are otherwise outside of Congress’s 
power.185 The Court found that the drinking-age limitation was 
germane to the purpose of the highway funding, because Congress 
wanted the funds to be used to provide safe highways, and underage 
drinkers present a higher risk of unsafe driving.186  
 Judicial review of the qualitative match between the two sides of a 
bargain has no counterpart in contract law. This suggests that the 
motivating concerns are quite different than those relating to 
ordinary markets, such as preventing duress. Four possibilities 
suggest themselves. 
 First, the problem may not be so much with the optimality of the 
bargain between the two parties as with the government’s potential 
shortcomings as an agent of the public. Conceivably, limiting 
purchases of constitutional rights to the use of conceptually related 
currency may make it easier for the public to assess whether the 
bargain is worthwhile. It is easier to compare apples with apples, so 
if we want to make transactions easy to monitor, we might want to 
prohibit exchanging apples for oranges. The concern here, 
paradoxically, is that the government may overpay for waivers of 
constitutional rights because officials have a conflict of interest—for 
                                                                                                                      
 179. Id. at 838-39. 
 180. Id. at 841. 
 181. See id at 832 (“[T]he right of way sought here is not naturally described as one to 
navigable water (from the street to the sea) but along it . . . .”).     
 182. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 183. See id. at 205.  
 184. Id. at 205-06. 
 185. Id. at 209.  
 186. Id. at 214.  
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example, politicians eager to stifle criticism of themselves or their 
own programs would pay a greater premium to eliminate dissent 
than the public would find worthwhile. 
 A variant of this rationale is that the bargain is one that the 
voters might approve of but that the Framers of the Constitution 
would not. The Framers may well have thought that criminal jury 
trials were a good thing, and they would only be willing to allow the 
government to avoid them (if at all) if there were some other positive 
social benefit. But the voters may think that jury trials are a bad 
thing and that the government should be willing to make sacrifices to 
get rid of them even if no other tangible benefits result. In this 
scenario, the government is an agent of the Framers as well as of the 
voters. Of course, since the Framers are not around to express their 
preferences in detail, in practical terms the Justices are likely to take 
that role on their behalf.  
 To put it in other terms, the government may offer benefits for 
waiving constitutional rights simply because it disagrees with the 
decision to constitutionalize them. Whoever did the constitutionalizing 
in the first place, whether the Framers or the Justices, would 
presumably want to block these transactions. A germaneness 
requirement may help ensure that the benefit received by the 
government is something other than satisfaction of an 
unconstitutional preference. This may have been Justice Scalia’s 
theory in Nollan.187 A more direct solution, however, would be to force 
the government to show some tangible interest other than hostility to 
the right itself; whether such an interest was closely related to the 
benefit offered by the government seems less important.  
 A third potential explanation is that this kind of restriction on 
alienation serves expressive purposes. It allows us to pretend that 
what has happened is not really a “sale” of a constitutional right but 
rather some more genteel arrangement. In other settings, 
restrictions on the terms of exchange serve to reinforce the existence 
of separate spheres of interests. For example, society allows sex to be 
exchanged for other forms of intimacy but not for money; this 
maintains the concept that sex relates to a different aspect of 
personhood than market transactions. For similar reasons, we may 
be willing to allow criminal defendants to exchange jury trial rights 
for shorter sentences but not willing to let them sell their jury trial 
rights for cash or for better food in prison. 
 It is worth noting one analogy in private transactions to the 
germaneness requirement. The federal antitrust statutes restrict tie-
ins by firms with market power, whereby the consumers must 
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purchase one good as a condition for purchasing another. One 
defense is that the two items are so closely related that they should 
not be considered two separate goods. This analogy would suggest 
limiting the germaneness requirement to situations where the 
government has market power. In a similar theory, germaneness 
might be a defense even if the government has market power. Yet 
even if the government does have market power, and even if the 
condition is not germane, the tie-in analogy suggests that courts 
should be fairly tolerant of funding conditions. In general, antitrust 
courts and economists have become fairly tolerant of tie-ins because 
harm to competition is often questionable and tie-ins can provide 
indirect benefits to consumers. If we consider an unconstitutional 
condition to be a tying arrangement between a government benefit 
and the surrender of a right, we would be more likely to accept the 
positive side of the germaneness rule (favoring germane conditions) 
than the negative side (prohibiting all nongermane conditions). 
 A fourth theory might be that the germaneness requirement 
promotes equality. Consider the paradigm of an unconstitutional 
condition, the requirement of a loyalty oath to obtain a tax benefit. 
Germaneness seems to be at its low point here. But note that the 
effect of the requirement is to obtain loyalty oaths only from a 
limited class of individuals, those who are subject to the tax. Why 
should these individuals be singled out? Any justification for 
imposing loyalty oaths would seem to have zero correlation with tax 
status.   
 Whatever the reason for the germaneness requirement, enforcing 
it creates two problems. First, courts seem to have had a great deal of 
difficulty in determining whether conditions are sufficiently 
germane. Thus, the germaneness requirement causes uncertainty 
and litigation. Second, since the effect of the requirement is to block 
efficient exchanges, the parties have every incentive to try to evade 
the restrictions. For example, a homeowner in the position of Mr. 
Nollan might well prefer to get a permit by giving the state a beach 
easement, which the Supreme Court frowned upon, rather than an 
access easement from the street, which the Court said was allowable. 
Preventing such bargains from being made may be difficult. 
Nongermaneness is a victimless crime. 
 Nexus or germaneness requirements seem to be most useful when 
two factors are present. First, it is most enforceable in situations 
where individualized bargaining is not an option. For example, the 
loyalty oath to qualify for a tax credit, by its nature, must be 
legislative—taxes are not set on the basis of individualized 
negotiations with an IRS agent. Even if they were, the IRS agent 
would probably be unimpressed by an offer to swap a loyalty oath for 
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a tax break. Thus, the Court can strike down such requirements 
without worrying about side bargains. 
 Second, a germaneness requirement is best applied at a fairly 
crude level. If a condition seems quite unconnected with the 
underlying program, then concerns about improper government 
motive, commodification, and equality become very plausible. If Mr. 
Nollan had been asked to sign a loyalty oath in return for getting a 
building permit, the bargain would be no more coercive or 
involuntary, yet the government’s demand would have been highly 
suspect. Nevertheless, the distinction between perpendicular and 
parallel easements, which the Court drew in Nollan, cannot 
plausibly be linked with any of these concerns. 
B.   Price Controls 
 The Supreme Court not only requires that the exchange be in 
some sense “like kind,” but that the exchange be fair so that the 
foregone right is not in some sense disproportionate. For example, in 
South Dakota v. Dole, the Court emphasized that only five percent of 
the state’s highway funds were at issue, so that the statute provided 
a mild inducement rather than a coercive threat.188 Thus, Congress 
could offer the states financial benefits in order to get them to 
comply, but it could not make the stakes too high. In other words, 
there is a somewhat ill-defined price control regime in the market for 
constitutional rights—the government can offer some inducement, 
but not too strong an inducement.  
 Again, a land use case shows this doctrine at its most vigorous. In 
Dolan v. City of Tigard,189 a case decided seven years after Nollan, 
the Court embellished on Nollan’s nexus requirement.190 Here, the 
land was used for a plumbing and electric supply store next to a 
creek.191  The owner wanted to double the size of the store and add a 
paved parking lot.192 As conditions on the development, the city 
required the owner to dedicate open land for a public greenway 
adjoining the creek’s floodplain and to agree to the construction of a 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the floodplain.193  
 The germaneness requirement was satisfied. The Court found 
both of these requirements to have the requisite nexus with the 
impacts of the project.194 The Court found it obvious that “a nexus 
exists between preventing flooding along Fanno Creek and limiting 
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development within the creek’s 100-year floodplain,” for the proposed 
development would expand the “impervious surface on the property” 
thereby “increasing the amount of storm water runoff into Fanno 
Creek.”195 Similarly, the Court found that a bike path would help 
relieve traffic congestion in the area that otherwise would be 
worsened by the development.196 
 The Court went on to add an additional requirement of “rough 
proportionality,” saying that “[n]o precise mathematical calculation 
is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development’s impact.”197 
The Court found this new requirement had not been satisfied.198 The 
government could not demonstrate any relationship between flood 
prevention and the requirement of public access to the greenway, and 
there was no showing that the bike path would actually be likely to 
offset the increased traffic demand.199 Thus, the Court scrutinized the 
exchange to make sure that the government was not being greedy in 
demanding more in exchange for the permit than it could justify.200  
 Under some circumstances, one might have the opposite concern: 
that the government would pay too little in exchange for waivers of 
rights. Rights holders may sometimes make excessive concessions to 
the government.  By doing this, rights holders allow their rights to be 
purchased too cheaply because certain rights have positive 
externalities, and the rights holder will not take these benefits into 
account when negotiating.201 Thus, there would be a good argument for 
ensuring that the government pays more for certain speech rights 
than the offerees themselves would demand. Otherwise, offerees may 
sell out “too cheaply.” But it is hard to see how Dolan would have 
harmed anyone but herself if she agreed to allow a bikepath on her 
property. On the contrary, there would presumably be a public benefit.   
 The concern in Dolan, however, was not that the stakes were too 
low (so the government would get what it wanted too cheaply), but 
rather that the stakes were too high, that it was too harsh to 
condition the building permit on agreement to the bike path. Thus, 
the bike path and the permit had to have some kind of proportionate 
value.  This type of price control is intended to prevent coercion; the 
government cannot make an offer that is irresistible to offerees. For 
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example, in Dole, the Court seemed to attach importance to the 
limited financial inducement offered the states, which was only five 
percent of their highway funds.202 So a fifty percent cut might have 
been invalid as coercive.  
 Threatening a five percent cut if X fails to do Y is roughly the 
same as offering a five percent bonus if X does do Y.203 So Dole can be 
read as a ban on government overpricing just as well as it can be 
read as a ban on excessive threats. Under Dole, the government can 
promise a five percent increase in funding if the state complies with 
its demands, but it cannot promise to double funding because that 
would be coercive—an offer that the recipient “couldn’t refuse.” 
 Whatever the reason for policing the terms of the exchange, 
contract theory makes it clear that this is going to be a very difficult 
enterprise. In private law, courts have long since given up on any 
general effort to ensure that prices are fair. Values are often 
idiosyncratic, and the parties often have better information on 
valuation than the court is likely to have. This does not necessarily 
mean that it is wrong for courts to undertake this task in public law, 
where the policies may be different. But what it does mean is that 
judicial performance inevitably will be quite erratic. We should not 
be surprised, therefore, that to the extent unconstitutional conditions 
decisions attempt to assess the fairness of the exchange, the 
resulting doctrine will turn out to be somewhat incoherent. In 
particular, the “rough proportionality” test is probably going to be no 
more reliable in the land use context than a similar requirement 
would be in ordinary market transactions. If two neighbors were 
negotiating over an easement, courts would not take it on themselves 
to determine if the price was too high. The fact that one of the 
neighbors is the government seems irrelevant. 
C.   Rethinking the Substantive Restrictions 
 The germaneness and proportionality requirements—or to put it 
another way, the currency and price controls—have four serious 
drawbacks. First, because they purport to be somewhat mechanical 
evaluations of the terms of the exchange, they save the court the 
trouble of considering whether there actually is a compelling reason 
for blocking a specific exchange. If, for example, a given exchange is 
objectionable because it treats the right in question like a commodity, 
the court should say so rather than invoking proportionality or 
germaneness. 
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 Second, because these restrictions block exchanges that the 
parties actually desire, they are likely to be met by evasion whenever 
transaction costs allow renegotiation. It is especially difficult to block 
these restrictions when the parties have a long-term or repeat 
relationship, because denying legal enforceability will not prevent 
informal quid pro quos. Denying legal enforceability to the resulting 
bargains may somewhat reduce their attractiveness, but it will 
always be problematic to get parties to eschew the bargains they 
prefer. This may be another reason to apply the restrictions more 
loosely, if they must be applied at all, when the bargain does not take 
the form of an adhesion contract. 
 Third, these doctrines require courts to make difficult judgments, 
at which they have not been very successful. The First Amendment 
cases, for example, show the difficulty of determining whether a 
funding restriction is logically related to a program’s purpose, in part 
because that purpose can be formulated in different ways. If the 
Court were also to apply the proportionality test to other rights, it 
might encounter even greater difficulties in trying to determine 
whether the restriction on funding was proportional to some 
government purpose such as protecting children from pornography or 
encouraging childbirth over abortion. What metric could we apply to 
make this determination?204 
 Finally, these restrictions seem at least in tension with the 
autonomy values that probably underlie most constitutional rights. 
For example, limiting the kind of easement that a landowner can 
convey to the state in exchange for a permit is somewhat at odds 
with the core concept of property: owning an interest in land 
normally means that you can exchange it on whatever terms you 
prefer. Similarly, sovereignty normally includes the power to enter 
into transactions on whatever terms the government entity prefers. 
If a state is willing to waive its immunity to be sued in federal court 
for patent infringement in return for increased highway funding, 
state sovereignty would seem to imply that it should have the power 
to do so. (Certainly, there would be no constitutional objection if the 
federal government were to waive sovereign immunity for patent 
infringement in return for another country’s promise of unrelated 
financial aid.) If we block these transactions, we should do so for 
reasons relating to defects in the bargaining process or third-party 
effects, rather than on the pretense that there is something 
inherently offensive about the terms of the bargain. 
 The Court has shown particular vigor in enforcing these 
substantive restrictions in the context of land use. This is puzzling. 
Property rights are inherently marketable, so treating property 
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interests like commodities is entirely appropriate. Moreover, the 
interests at stake in the cases have not been particularly weighty—
the right to deny beach access or a bike path surely does not lie at 
the very heart of our constitutional pantheon or even at the heart of 
the Takings Clause. Finally, it may be especially difficult to enforce 
these restrictions on concessions by developers to the government 
because there are so many opportunities for informal bargains 
between developers and land use regulators. 
 Of course, proportionality is a desirable goal. The government 
should impose conditions on permits that are proportionate to the 
public interests involved, just as it should engage in regulation and 
taxation proportionate to the public interest. So, too, should the 
prices of goods be proportionate to their true values. But we have 
long since realized that enforcing this kind of proportionality 
requirement is as much beyond judicial competence in public law as 
it is in contract law. Indeed, the Court has recently declared that 
even in the takings context, it is not for judges to determine how 
much a land use restriction serves the public interest.205 Dollan is an 
unwelcome aberration. 
 The proportionality test applied in Dole has the same flaw. How 
can we judge whether a five percent or twenty percent incentive is 
proportionate? Any sensible test would require that we determine 
the strength of the public interest served. For instance, surely no one 
would say that a funding condition critical to national security can be 
pursued only with mild inducements. If such a national security-
based condition put heavy pressure on states to agree, so much the 
better. Even judging the degree of pressure on the states requires 
some sensitive judgments about political dynamics—the effect of a 
funding condition depends on the state’s need for the benefit, the 
availability of alternative funding, and the degree of internal public 
support for the condition itself, not just on the percentage or dollar 
amount of the inducement. This hardly seems like a suitable inquiry 
for courts. 
 Thus, as in private law, it seems fruitless for courts in public law 
to take it on themselves to determine the fairness of bargains, except 
perhaps in the most extraordinary cases. In both public law and 
private law, strong incentives may make the recipients feel 
pressured. That may be unfortunate, but courts are ill-equipped to 
intervene. 
                                                                                                                      
 205. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
2006]                    ANOTHER VIEW OF THE QUAGMIRE               951 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The problem of unconstitutional conditions is probably too 
difficult to yield to any one analytic technique. If more intuitive 
approaches had resolved the problem satisfactorily, there would be 
little reason to consider the default rule approach except for 
academia’s thirst for novelty. In fact, the best that can be said for 
more intuitive approaches, such as tests based on coercion or 
germaneness, is that they are helpful under some circumstances. It 
seems wise, therefore, to try another way. 
 Whether a particular constitutional right should be alienable at 
all may be a difficult question, and perhaps current doctrine allows 
too much alienability. But given that a particular right has been 
determined to be alienable, what happens looks very much like a 
contract: the government provides some benefit in consideration of a 
waiver of the right. It is not too much to hope that contract theory 
might help illuminate this situation. 
 Contract theory suggests a greater focus on transaction costs, 
information asymmetries, and other potential flaws in the bargaining 
process, along with the possibility of adverse effects on the 
constitutional rights of third parties such as clients or customers. This 
analysis does not mean a free pass for conditional benefits. For 
example, in the abortion-counseling case (Rust), potentially serious 
third-party effects were present. Moreover, there may be reasons to 
object to bargains regardless of whether they serve the interests of the 
parties, such as maintaining a symbolic separation between personal 
rights and financial interests, or policing for improper government 
motivation. Courts need to be explicit about these justifications, 
however, rather than manipulating vague terms like coercion or 
germaneness to justify their decisions. 
 Contract theory is as illuminating for what it fails to explain as for 
what it explains. Unconstitutional conditions involve some problems 
without private law analogues—in particular, concerns about 
government motivation and about equality. Mixing these concerns 
with problems of coercion or involuntariness can only lead to 
misunderstandings. 
 Thus, what contract theory ultimately has to offer is not a full 
solution to the problem of unconstitutional conditions. Rather, the 
benefit is improved clarity in perceiving and sorting out the issues. A 
clear view of the unconstitutional conditions quagmire reveals a messy 
scene, with complex empirical and normative dimensions, rather than a 
crystalline logical structure. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
is not, alas, a cathedral, no matter in what light we observe it. But it is 
better to get a clear view of the swamp rather than to fool ourselves into 
believing that there is a cathedral buried somewhere beneath the muck.
